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Revisiting the “Responsibility to Protect” and the 
Use of Force  
 
Mats Berdal 
 
Abstract  
 
When the UN General Assembly met to debate the R2P in June 2018, the 
mood was sombre. Efforts to “operationalize” the R2P continue to 
encounter resistance from key member states. Where it matters most, 
among vulnerable civilian populations caught up in war and violent 
conflict, the R2P appears to be making scant difference. Rising 
geopolitical tensions, reflected in the breakdown of political 
relations among key members of the Security Council, have only added 
to a growing sense of pessimism among R2P advocates. For Member 
States, the most contentions aspect of the R2P concept continues, 
entirely unsurprisingly, to revolve around the question of the use 
of force for humanitarian purposes. It is a subject on which States, 
for an admixture of historical and political reasons, remain – and 
will continue to remain – deeply divided. Nonetheless, as a 
politically significant norm or standard of international society, 
the R2P has gradually come to command broad support from States, 
even though the degree to which the R2P norm has been truly 
internalised across international society varies greatly. 
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Revisiting the “Responsibility to Protect” and the 
Use of Force  
 
Mats Berdal 
 
Introduction 
 
In June 2018, for the first time in nearly a decade, the UN 
General Assembly met in a formal session to debate the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The debate, as António Guterres 
made clear in his opening remarks, took “place against a backdrop of 
atrocity crimes being committed at a scale and ferocity not seen in 
years, with little regard for international human rights and 
humanitarian law” (UN Secretary-General, 2018). Since the divisive 
and controversial NATO-led intervention in Libya in 2011, a number 
of developments have only added to the widespread sense that the R2P 
is now “in a state of suspended animation, finely crafted in words 
but breached time and again in practice”(UN Secretary-General, 
2018). Rising nationalisms; mounting evidence of a retreat from 
multilateralism and values-driven diplomacy; diminishing interest on 
the part of key powers in consolidating the normative gains of the 
1990s; profound political divisions within Security Council – all of 
these have combined to raise questions about the future of the R2P. 
Indeed, to many observers and analysts of the General Assembly 
debate, it looked as if the campaign to entrench the R2P “as a 
powerful new galvanising norm” (Thakur, 2011) had come to dead end. 
 
Focus and Central Argument 
 
Against this, the present article examines the conceptual 
evolution and attempt at “operationalizing” the R2P from its 
immediate origins in the horrors of Rwanda and Srebrenica to the 
General Assembly debate in 2018. It is specifically concerned with 
the most contentious aspect of the concept and its history: the use 
of military force in a coercive capacity to protect populations at 
risk from mass atrocities.  
Now, there is an obvious temptation, in light of the broad 
picture sketched above, to present the history of the R2P in simple 
rise-and-fall terms: that is, as the story of how the horrors of 
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Rwanda and Srebrenica concentrated the liberal conscience, 
stimulated conceptual innovation and lead to a growing consensus 
around the idea of “sovereignty as responsibility”(Deng et.al, 
1996), culminating in the formal endorsement of the R2P idea by the 
General Assembly in 2005, only to be followed by the reassertion of 
power politics, a sharpening of great power rivalry, normative 
retrenchment, and growing resistance to the R2P in the wake of 
NATO’s Libya intervention.  
There is unquestionably a hard core of truth to this 
narrative. And yet, it can also simplify a more complex and nuanced 
picture, notwithstanding the profoundly inauspicious international 
political context within which the R2P is currently struggling to 
take root. Uncovering that complexity requires that a clear 
distinction – emphasized by Edward Luck while serving as Special 
Advisor to Secretary-General on the R2P in 2011 - to be maintained 
between understanding the R2P as, on the one hand, a politically 
significant norm, principle or standard of acceptable behaviour in 
international society, and, on the other, as an instrument of policy 
and actual “guide to tactical choices” (Luck,2011,p.388). In the 
former sense, the R2P has gradually come to command broad support 
from States, even though the degree to which the R2P norm has been 
truly internalised across international society varies greatly. In 
the latter sense, the R2P is mired in controversy. For reasons to be 
explored more fully, however, when it comes to the question of the 
use of force, this is also a controversy that is inescapable, 
unlikely ever to be fully overcome or “resolved” by a doctrinal fix 
or further conceptual innovation. As will be argued, there is simply 
no prospect of agreement being reached among states on precise, 
watertight and operationally meaningful criteria for exactly when 
and in what circumstances to use force in a coercive capacity for 
humanitarian purposes. This does not mean, however, that the R2P 
idea has lost its normative force and influence in international 
society, nor does it mean that the idea has not left a mark, in more 
indirect ways, on the calculations and policies of states and 
international organisations. 
In developing these arguments further, the article is divided 
into three closely connected parts. 
  
4 
The first of these examines key stages in the evolution of the 
R2P from its immediate origins in the “never-again” moment that 
followed the genocide in Rwanda and the mass slaughter in 
Srebrenica, through to the articulation of a carefully crafted and, 
in many ways, intellectually rigorous and impressive three-pillar 
strategy for implementing the R2P, presented by the UN Secretary-
General in 2009.  
The second part looks in greater detail at NATO’s military 
intervention in Libya, its consequences and wider significance. This 
is of more than just historical interest. Crucially, it helps to 
bring out - in ways that more abstract discussions of principles, 
process and procedures cannot fully hope to do - the practical 
challenges, policy dilemmas and moral conundrums raised by the use 
of military force for humanitarian purposes as these present 
themselves in real-world cases.  
The third and final section places the post-Cold War evolution 
and current status of the R2P in a longer-term historical 
perspective. Although, as will be stressed, the grounds for 
pessimism are real and troubling, there is enough evidence to 
suggest that as a principle and expression of common humanity, the 
R2P has not been confined to the historical graveyard.  
 
 
I. FROM THE RWANDA GENOCIDE TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1973 
 
“Never Again” – The Immediate Origins and Evolution of the R2P, 
1994-2005 
 
Over the course of some one hundred days in April and May 
1994, an estimated 800,000 people, mostly Tutsis but also many 
moderate Hutu men, women and children, were systematically 
slaughtered in Rwanda. The staggering scale, speed and sheer horror 
of the Rwandan genocide remain difficult, if not impossible, to 
comprehend. What is clear is that it was foretold, carefully 
planned, and made possible by the passivity and indifference of the 
international community. Reflecting later on his experiences as 
Force Commander of the UN Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) before and 
during the genocide, Roméo Dallaire was adamant that ”a great many 
opportunities to destabilise the génocidaires and derail the 
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genocide” had been lost (Dallaire, 2003, p.514). ”If UNAMIR had 
received the modest increase of troops and capabilities we requested 
in the first week”, he insisted, the killings could have been 
stopped (Dallaire, 2003, p.514). The independent Inquiry on UN 
actions in Rwanda released in 1999 concurred, arguing that “a force 
of 2,500 should have been able to stop or at least limit the 
massacres” (‘Carlson Report’, 1999, p.30). The efficiency and speed 
with which national evacuation operations by France, Belgium, the US 
and Italy were organised and carried out in mid-April 1994, confirm 
Dallaire’s assessment: as a practical or technical proposition, 
reinforcing the mission was always an operationally credible option. 
The real obstacle to derailing the genocide, of course, lay 
elsewhere, specifically, in the lack of political will on the part 
of major powers to contemplate any form of proactive action that 
might have obstructed the génocidaires. The clearest and most 
striking manifestation of this disposition towards inaction in the 
face of mass slaughter was provided by the Clinton administration, 
which, on 15 April 1994, informed fellow Council members that “the 
international community must give highest priority to full, orderly 
withdrawal of all UNAMIR personnel as soon as possible” (US 
Secretary of State, 1994). On that very day, Dallaire reported back 
to New York that “a systematic extermination of Tutsis is taking 
place” behind the lines of Rwandese Government Forces (Force 
Commander, UNAMIR, 1994,15 April), while UNAMIR’s newly created 
Humanitarian Assistance Cell (HAC), also on 15 April, reported 
“approximately 20,000 unburied bodies” in Kigali alone “as a result 
of widespread massacres” (HAC, UNAMIR, 1994, 15 April).  
The following year, in July 1995, a smaller, though no less 
horrific, mass atrocity crime was perpetrated in eastern Yugoslavia 
by Bosnian Serb forces under Ratko Mladić. Having overrun the 
supposedly “UN safe-area” of Srebrenica, Mladić’s soldiers proceeded 
to execute some eight thousand of the pre-dominantly Muslim 
population of the town. As in Rwanda, the Srebrenica massacre 
dramatically exposed the failure of the international community, 
represented by the UN’s troubled peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, to 
respond to mass atrocity crimes. In the searing words of the 
Srebrenica Report into the actions of the UN leading up to the 
massacre: “Through error, misjudgement and an inability to recognise 
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the scope of evil confronting us, we failed to do our part to help 
save the people of Srebrenica from the Serb campaign of mass murder” 
(“The Fall of Srebrenica”, 1999, paragraph 503.) 
The realisation that the use of military force might, at the 
very least, have helped to limit the scale of the slaughter in 
Rwanda and Srebrenica - and the sense of guilt which this induced in 
the Western liberal conscience – inevitably influenced the debate 
about the challenges of atrocity prevention after 1995. Although, as 
Adam Roberts rightly observed, neither in the case of Rwanda nor of 
Srebrenica “was there a major problem regarding the legality of 
intervention” (Roberts, 2002-3, p.159), in the soul-searching that 
followed those catastrophes, the principal impediment to the timely 
use of force in any future scenario was seen to lie in the “old 
orthodoxy” on intervention (Annan, 1998). Kofi Annan, who had served 
as head of UN peacekeeping at the time of both Rwanda and 
Srebrenica, played a key role in challenging that orthodoxy, and, 
indeed, would come to view his principal achievement in office as 
having helped ensure that “respect for national sovereignty can no 
longer be used as a shield by governments’ intent on massacring 
their own people, or as an excuse for the rest of us to do nothing 
when such heinous crimes are committed” (Annan,2006).  
While the issues of sovereignty and legality of intervention 
were not central to the failure to intervene over Rwanda and 
Srebrenica, NATO’s military intervention to halt Serbian military 
action in Kosovo in 1999, justified on grounds of  “overwhelming 
humanitarian necessity” but undertaken without prior Security 
Council authorisation, did raise those issues starkly (see Schnabel 
& Thakur, 2000; Foreign Affairs Committee, 2000, pp.137-175). While 
regretting the failure of the Security Council to reach agreement on 
a collective response to the Kosovo crisis, Kofi Annan, speaking 
during the NATO campaign, nonetheless welcomed what he described as 
an emerging “international norm against the violent repression of 
minorities that will and must take precedence over the concerns of 
State sovereignty” (Annan, 1999). While Annan accepted, in his own 
words, that “military intervention became necessary” (UN Secretary-
General, 2000, 5 October). in Kosovo, to others – notably the G-77 
and NAM grouping of states - NATO’s decision to intervene without 
Security Council authorisation represented little more than an 
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arrogation of the “right to take arbitrary and unilateral action … a 
return to anarchy, where might is right’” (UN Security Council, 
1999, 24 March, p.15).1 
The controversies over Kosovo are of special interest because 
they provided an important part of the background to the 
establishment of the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty, whose stated ambition was to help forge a “new 
international consensus” on the issues raised by the intervention 
for humanitarian protection purposes (ICISS, 2000). Proceeding from 
the principle that sovereignty implies responsibility (Deng 
et.al.,1996), the central achievement of the Commission was to 
recognise the importance of language and seek to shift the terms of 
debate around the use force in defence of human rights. As Thakur 
and Thomas Weiss would later put it, the Responsibility to Protect 
was chosen “because it was less confrontational and polarizing, more 
likely to lead to a consensus across the bitter North-South divide” 
(Thakur & Weiss, 2009,pp.46-47). “Humanitarian intervention”, they 
added, “approaches the topic explicitly from the Western 
interveners’ perspective and isolates and privileges 
‘intervention’”(Thakur & Weiss, 2009,pp.46-47). By contrast the R2P 
is “victim-centred and surrounds intervention with prevention before 
and rebuilding afterwards” (Thakur & Weiss, 2009,pp.46-47). 
Now, whilst an alternative to “humanitarian intervention” was 
found and widely appropriated, itself a significant achievement, at 
a deeper level, the ICISS report cannot be said to have overcome or 
reconciled the tensions at heart of previous debates about 
humanitarian intervention. In particular, while the “aim of 
providing precise guidance for states faced with human protection 
claims in other states” (ICISS, 2001,p.viii) was laudable, as 
Roberts emphasised in his perceptive assessment of the Commission’s 
final report, decisions with regard to individual cases invariably 
 
1 It needs to be stressed that references throughout the present article to 
the Group of 77 (G-77), the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the “Global 
South” are not meant to imply complete uniformity and consistency of views 
across what is a large and diverse body of UN member states. The terms are 
used here to convey a particular - widely shared and historically rooted - 
attachment to the order-related provisions of the UN Charter. Of the G-77 
and NAM it might also be added that, while they have largely outlived their 
original purposes, they have found a new lease of life as inter-
governmental caucuses articulating the views, and seeking to coordinate the 
positions, of the “Global South” within UN forums and conference settings. 
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involve “a balancing of two important bodies of law – the one 
restricting the resort to force, and the other upholding human 
rights and humanitarian norms” (Roberts, 2002-3, p.159). Reaching 
prior and general agreement on how to achieve that balance poses the 
same kind of challenges for the R2P as in the past it did for 
humanitarian intervention.  
There is a further consideration here relating to the ICISS 
report. The hope that a consensus could nonetheless be forged in 
spite of the inherent tensions alluded to above, was based on the 
conviction that the end of the Cold War had resulted in “a new 
opportunity and capacity for common action” (ICISS,2001,p.7). 
Specifically, the commissioners felt there was now “a genuine 
prospect of the Security Council fulfilling the role envisioned for 
it in the UN Charter”(ICISS,2001,p.7). “Globalization”, the report 
asserted further, had also led to “a pronounced trend towards 
multilateral cooperation” (ICISS,2001,p.7). This emphasis on new 
opportunities is both understandable and unsurprising in a blue-
ribbon report of this kind – indeed, highlighting them is arguably a 
key aspect of what blue-ribbon panels are about. And yet, both of 
these claims rested on assumptions about the irreversibility of 
trends in world politics that were ahistorical and questionable, 
something that the geopolitical fall-out from the events of 9/11 and 
the subsequent “9/11 wars” in Afghanistan and Iraq would soon 
demonstrate. The main point here, however, is a larger one: the 
tendency, especially pronounced in the 1990s, to view the end of the 
Cold War as a radical break or disjunction in world politics, also 
carried with it the tendency, whether implicitly or explicitly, to 
neglect the continuing importance of interest and historical memory 
as determinants of State conduct.  
 
 
The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document 
  
At a gathering of heads of state and government to mark the 60th 
anniversary of the UN in September 2005, the General Assembly agreed 
on an Outcome Document that formally endorsed the R2P (UN General 
Assembly, 2005). Affirming, firstly, that “each individual State has 
the responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war 
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crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”, Member States 
also agreed in principle to take collective action, “including under 
Chapter VII, should peaceful means be inadequate and national 
authorities manifestly [be] failing to protect their populations” 
from the aforesaid mass atrocity crimes(UN General Assembly, 2005, 
paragraphs 138 and 139). The inclusion of the R2P paragraphs in the 
Outcome Document represented the crowning achievement of Annan’s 
campaign to promote the R2P norm. 
The achievement should not be belittled or understated, 
however troubled the subsequent history of the R2P’s implementation 
has proved to be. It marked the first time, as Michael Wood, Legal 
Advisor to the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office between 1999 and 
2006, noted not long afterwards, that the General Assembly had 
signed off on a qualification to sovereignty and accepted the idea 
that enforcement action to protect against massive human rights 
violation now falls within the remit of the Security Council without 
“reference to a need to find some international element” (Wood, 
2006, p.8) to justify intervention. As such, the paragraphs 
suggested general agreement on a standard of state conduct that 
covered behaviour also within the domestic jurisdiction of the 
State. Reaching agreement on this against the backdrop of the deep 
political divisions caused by the US-led invasion of Iraq, which by 
early 2005 had descended into a catastrophic civil war, was itself a 
major achievement.2 
And yet the significance of the R2P provisions in the Outcome 
Document can easily be exaggerated. There are three aspects to this 
that merit special attention.  
First, the incorporation of R2P, although a politically 
significant commitment, was certainly not an automatic trigger for 
action, nor did it suggest that a general right of intervention on 
humanitarian grounds had been widely endorsed by Member States. 
Indeed, states steered away from including a set of criteria to be 
applied when considering the possible use of force in situations 
where massive human rights violations were, or might be, committed, 
 
2 A good insight into the tensions and toxic atmosphere surrounding the 
World Summit can be gained from John Bolton’s account of his time as 
permanent representative of the US to the UN in 2005 and 2006, a book 
tellingly, if also curiously, entitled Surrender is Not an Option (see 
Bolton, 2007, chapter 7). 
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an approach that the ICISS had championed and Kofi Annan had also 
supported (UN Secretary-General, 2005). A careful reading of the 
relevant provisions and the accompanying commentary by member 
states, also reveal much greater caution in other respects when 
comparison is made to the report of the ICISS and the Kofi Annan’s 
own reform proposals (see Welsh,2006, pp.23-44; Luck,2010, pp.113-
117). In particular, the Outcome Document firmly vested collective 
action under responsibility to protect in the Security Council 
acting under Chapter VII. Moreover, and as noted above, in the 
Outcome Document states limited the scope of R2P to four specific 
categories of atrocity crimes.  
Second, agreement on the R2P formulation in the Outcome 
Document did not signify that policy elites in Russia and China – 
both permanent, veto-wielding powers on the Council - had 
internalised the normative shift in favour of sovereignty as 
responsibility. For much of the 1990s, the so-called “P-3” - the UK, 
France and the US – had been the permanent members that called the 
shots, made the decisions, and set the agenda on the Security 
Council. This dominance was also, however, a function of the fact 
that Russia and China were both deeply pre-occupied with major 
domestic challenges. Having inherited the Soviet Union’s permanent 
seat on the Council in 1991, Russia remained in position of relative 
weakness throughout much of the 1990s. The Chinese Communist Party 
for its part was preoccupied with the aftermath of the Tiananmen 
Square crackdown, seeking new a source of legitimacy by harnessing 
popular nationalism, promoting economic growth and “reinventing 
itself as a developing state” (Mitter, 2004,p.290). Yet, both 
Russian deference and the comparative lack of Chinese involvement in 
Council affairs were never a reflection of a basic harmony of 
interests with other Council members, let alone a normative 
convergence around “solidarist values”(Mayall, 2000). That it 
nonetheless appeared this way to some observers was a function of 
the fact, as Rana Mitter noted with respect to China, that the 
“policy-making elite uses the language of international engagement 
to define its place in the world order of today; it talks in terms 
of human rights, international trade, and peaceful coexistence, 
while appropriating the meaning of those terms for its own purposes” 
(Mitter, 2003,p.234). In spite of this, profound and underlying 
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fault-lines became more evident in the first half of the 2000s as 
both countries – against the backdrop of the Bush administration’s 
response to 9/11 – positioned themselves more vocally as 
counterweights to American power. The process whereby these 
translated into greater assertiveness and activism on the Council, 
however, was a gradual one and only came fully to the fore under Ban 
Ki-Moon (Berdal,2014). It is true that, over time and especially 
since 2005, China has become more actively involved in the normative 
discourse around the R2P at the UN (Fung, 2016). As discussed below, 
however, this greater engagement does not signify any fundamental 
modification or relaxation of China’s ironclad commitment to the 
sanctity of the principle of sovereignty and the obligation of non-
intervention.    
Third, the willingness to sign up to the R2P in 2005, 
notwithstanding Russian and Chinese misgivings, widely shared by 
members of the G-77 and NAM, was also, quite plainly, closely linked 
to the fact that the document was entirely silent on the actual 
implementation of R2P principle. In particular, it offered no 
details on how military action might be triggered in response to a 
“manifest failure to protect”. To that extent, Mark Malloch-Brown’s 
verdict on the significance of the R2P’s inclusion in the Outcome 
Document was basically right: “It was a tentative victory, 
grudgingly acknowledging that in extreme circumstance, if states 
abused their citizens on a mass and systematic basis, outside 
intervention might be necessary, but it was short on detail” 
(Malloch-Brown, 2011, p.74). 
 
Developing a Strategy for Implementing the R2P, 2005-2011  
 
Conscious of the “fledgling nature of agreement on Responsibility to 
Protect” (UN Secretary-General, 2007, 7 December), Ban Ki-Moon, who 
replaced Kofi Annan as Secretary-General in January 2007, set out to 
turn the “words of the 2005 World Summit Outcome into doctrine, 
policy and, most importantly, deeds” (UN Secretary-General, 2009, 
para.67). The upshot was Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, 
a strategy paper aimed at reversing mounting criticism of and 
diminishing support for the concept, especially from those G-77/NAM 
states for whom the R2P was “becoming another version of 
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humanitarian intervention“(Zhenmin, 2009, 24 July). Operationalizing 
the R2P was always going to be a tall order in the toxic political 
atmosphere following the World Summit, an atmosphere nourished by 
the war in Iraq and NATO’s escalating involvement in Afghanistan. 
The key to it was seen, rightly, to lie in a renewed emphasis on R2P 
as “an ally of sovereignty, not an adversary”, and, alongside this, 
an emphasis on the value and central importance of prevention (UN 
Secretary-General, 2009, paragraph 10(a)). This emphasis was 
reflected in the report’s conception of the R2P as resting on three 
“mutually supporting” pillars. Under the third pillar, the report 
acknowledged the need in extreme circumstances for a “timely and 
decisive response”, including the robust use of military force to 
save lives. It placed equal stress, however, on the need for action 
under two other pillars: first, the State’s own and primary 
responsibility to protect its citizens, and, second, measures of 
international assistance to strengthen the capacities of States to 
provide protection. The report discussed these by reference to a 
broad range of prevention and capacity-building activities and 
initiatives by the UN, citing examples from Northern Uganda to 
Kosovo (UN Secretary-General, 2009, paragraphs 28-48). 
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect is an 
intellectually rigorous and impressive document, which credibly 
seeks to meet the concerns of the wider UN membership without 
sacrificing too much on substance. An important reason for this was 
undoubtedly that its author, Edward Luck - appointed Special Advisor 
on the R2P to Ban Ki-Moon with responsibility for “conceptual 
development and consensus building” in 2007 (UN Secretary-General, 
2007, December 7) in 2007 – came to the task with a clear-eyed 
appreciation, all too often missing in commentary on the UN, of the 
importance of history and politics to an understanding of the how 
the organisation actually functions (and, concomitantly, how neglect 
of history and politics has in the past invariably doomed reform to 
failure).3 The lasting legacy of the report lies in the basic 
acceptance it has secured for the three-pillar structure on which 
the R2P is seen   to rest, even though, unsurprisingly, support for 
 
3 See in particular Edward Luck, “How Not to Reform the UN”, Global 
Governance, vol. 11, no.4, 2005, pp.407-414. The article is of special 
interest also because it covers the reform debates in the run up to the 
2005 World Summit.  
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pillars one and two have proved much less controversial than pillar 
three. As India’s delegate to the 2018 General Assembly debate 
stated:    
 
“…India, like many others, has little disagreement with the 
rationale of the cardinal features of the first and second 
pillars of the responsibility to protect. However, we are of the 
view that appropriate ways should be found to address the 
legally complex and politically challenging issues that underlie 
the third pillar. In our view, the ability of the international 
community to take appropriate collective action if a State 
manifestly fails to fulfil its responsibility to protect its 
population is still riddled with serious gaps that must be 
reflected on (UN General Assembly,2018,13).”  
 
 
As several scholars have noted, China has, notably since 2005, 
become more actively engaged in debates and policy discussion 
about the R2P at the UN, employing solidarist language and 
gradually adopting what may be described as cautious and qualified 
support of the concept (Fung, 2016). Crucially, however, Chinese 
advocacy for the R2P has focused, unsurprisingly, on pillars one 
and two in ways that have adroitly “allow[ed] it to appear 
cooperative and conciliatory without ceding ground on its vital 
interest to preserve sovereignty and restrict interventionist 
claims” (Teitt, 2011,p.310). As one assessment of its growing 
engagement in the R2P debate notes, China has been “successful in 
reaffirming support for a state-centric system by narrowing the 
emerging principle” (Fung, 2016, see also Fung, 2019). This focus 
on the State’s own and primary responsibility to protect remains 
central, and will remain so, to China’s position. It is one that 
will only have been reinforced by the – in the eyes of the 
Communist Party (CPC) leadership – deeply unwelcome light that has 
been shone on the widespread and systematic repression, justified 
on grounds of “combatting religious extremism and terrorism”, of 
its ethnic Uighur community in the province of Xinjiang. Indeed, 
by mid-2019, evidence of growing repression led one prominent 
monitoring body to conclude that the Chinese government was itself 
“failing to uphold its responsibility to protect” (R2P Monitor, 
2019,p.15). 
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The deeper sources of the reservations expressed about pillar 
three, which remain widespread, are best explored in relation to the 
NATO’s intervention in Libya. 
 
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE AND CONSEQUENCES OF LIBYA  
 
On 17th March 2011, the UN Security Council authorised member 
states “to take all necessary measures … to protect civilians and 
civilian populated areas under threat of attack” from forces 
determined to crush a popular uprising against the internationally 
isolated and brutal regime of Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi (S/RES/1973, 
2011). Against the background of a deepening civil war, Resolution 
1973, passed with five abstentions (Russia, China, Brazil, India 
and Germany), provided the legal basis for Western-led military 
intervention to protect civilians at risk of large-scale atrocities 
in Libya. Within days, a bombing campaign, spearheaded by France, 
the UK and the US, was underway.4 Some seven months and more than 
26,000 air sorties later, Qadhafi was captured and killed while in 
custody near his hometown of Sirte. Shortly afterwards, NATO’s 
Secretary-General, meeting with the new Libyan leadership in 
Tripoli, announced the formal end of the alliance’s combat mission. 
Now, for advocates of the R2P, including eminent scholars who 
had helped develop and refine the principle over the previous 
decade, the Council’s decision to authorise the use of military 
force was widely welcomed at the time as a defining moment, not 
merely in relation to Libya but, crucially, also for the evolution 
of R2P itself. Writing a few days into the air campaign, Ramesh 
Thakur, a distinguished scholar and member of the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), was in no 
doubt as to its significance:   
 
“Resolution 1973 marks the first military implementation of the 
doctrine of ‘responsibility to protect’. Had the international 
community shirked this responsibility, Libya could have become 
R2P’s graveyard (Thakur, 2011).” 
 
 
4 Initially under US command, NATO took charge of the Libyan air campaign, 
renaming it Operation Unified Protector, on 31 March 2011. 
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In early May 2011, Ban Ki-Moon, in an uncharacteristically 
impassioned speech, went further still: “what is happening in 
Libya, Cote d'Ivoire and elsewhere is an historic precedent, a 
watershed in the emerging doctrine of the responsibility to 
protect” (Ban Ki-Moon, 2011). And Gareth Evans, co-chair of the 
ICISS and former Australian Foreign Minister, considered Libya ”an 
absolutely textbook case” for the R2P doctrine (Crosette, 2012).  
It did not take long, however, for criticisms and doubts over 
NATO’s motives and actions in Libya to set in. As the military 
campaign escalated and became more plainly geared towards the 
removal of Qadhafi from power, controversy about the way in which 
the R2P had been invoked, or was now being cited, to justify 
military intervention only intensified further. On the Security 
Council, criticism was led by India, Brazil, Russia and China, all 
of whom had already expressed reservations about the vague and open-
ended wording of Resolution 1973 (UN Security Council, 2011). South 
Africa, although it voted in favour of the use of force, quickly 
became an ardent critic of NATO’s deepening involvement and what it 
too saw as a flagrant violation of the spirit of Resolution 1973. 
Echoing objections that, historically, had been at the heart of 
debates about the risks of humanitarian intervention – the dangers 
of abuse, selectivity and inconsistency when intervening on what are 
ostensibly humanitarian grounds – these critics all came to view 
NATO’s intervention less as a watershed moment for the R2P than a 
return to much older power political habits and practices on the 
part of major powers.  
Why did the Libya intervention move so rapidly from being a 
“text book case” to a highly divisive and controversial military 
operation, the political fall-out of which continues to cast a long 
shadow over inter-governmental debates about and attitudes towards 
the R2P idea? 
There are two levels at which the question and the 
controversies surrounding R2P’s application in Libya needs to be 
approached. The first relates specifically to developments in Libya, 
and requires a clear distinction to be made between events leading 
up to the adoption of Resolution 1973 and its subsequent 
implementation. The second is related to the concerns held by a 
significant number of non-European states (sometimes crudely 
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labelled as belonging to the “Global South”) about the deeper, 
unspoken objectives of Western military intervention in the service 
of justice and human rights. These concerns are rooted in a 
distinctive historical experience and memory of colonial rule and 
external incursion, as well as in more recent developments following 
the US declaration of a “global war on terror” in response to the 
9/11 attacks. Together these provided a cognitive framework and a 
political context through which developments in Libya were 
interpreted. Their effect was to magnify worries about the misuse of 
R2P by major powers.  
 
From civilian protection to regime change  
  X2 
The wave of anti-government protests, street demonstrations 
and popular uprisings which, beginning in Tunisia in late 2010, 
swept across much of the Middle East and North Africa, reached Libya 
in February 2011. Colonel Qadhafi – in power for more than forty 
years but, by this stage, profoundly isolated internationally – 
responded to the stirrings of the Arab Spring in his country with 
the kind of savage ruthlessness that had long since come to define 
his regime (UN Human Rights Council, 2011). His violent crackdown 
failed, however, to quell popular protests, which quickly escalated 
into a full-scale uprising and civil war. Alarmed by the ferocity of 
government’s response to the uprising, the Security Council, in a 
unanimous resolution passed less than two weeks into the uprising, 
Resolution 1970, deplored the “the gross and systematic violation of 
human rights … against the civilian population made from the highest 
level of the Libyan government” (S/RES/1970, 2011). Acting under 
Chapter VII, the Council referred the situation in Libya to the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), froze the assets of senior 
regime officials and imposed an arms embargo (S/RES/1970, 2011, 
paragraphs 4,9 and 17). By the middle of March, with regime 
loyalists on the offensive and the city of Benghazi where the 
uprising had begun on the verge of being overrun, the Council passed 
a second resolution on Libya, this time with a mandate “to take all 
necessary measures to protect civilians” (S/RES/1973, 2011). 
The immediate context within which Resolution 1973 was adopted 
was one of a fast-moving, confused and rapidly deteriorating 
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humanitarian situation on the ground. In late February, Navi Pillay, 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, stated that while reports 
were “still patchy and hard to verify, one thing is painfully clear: 
… the crackdown in Libya of peaceful demonstrations is escalating 
alarmingly with reported mass killings, arbitrary arrests, detention 
and torture of protestors.”5 “Patchy and hard to verify” and 
“escalating alarmingly”, yet also “painfully clear”:  this, indeed, 
is how humanitarian protection crises often present themselves in 
the midst of unfolding violence and war. It is also why they place a 
premium on time-sensitive political decisions and actions, and leave 
limited time for exhaustive and fully informed consideration of 
“threshold” and “trigger” criteria for outside intervention. What 
was not in doubt in the weeks before the adoption of Resolution 1973 
was Qadhafi’s stated intention of showing “no mercy or compassion” 
to the citizens of Benghazi (Kirkpatrick & Fahim, 2011). In view of 
the murderous and brutal history of his regime – a view that the 
picture emerging on ground in Libya in February and March only 
served to reinforce - there was every reason to take Qadhafi’s 
threat seriously. On 12th March, with the momentum of the regime’s 
counter-offensive gathering pace, the League of Arab States declared 
its support for a no-fly zone, a decision that promised to lend 
legitimacy to Western-led action but also underscored growing and 
widespread alarm at the prospect of mass atrocities in Benghazi. It 
was against the background of these developments that France and the 
UK pushed for the adoption of Resolution 1973. The objective was 
immediate and short term, not part of a deliberate and carefully 
worked out strategy to effect regime change. The prospect of 
“bloodbath in Benghazi and a massacre of civilians”6, it was felt, 
could not be ignored. As Jean-David Levitte, President Sarkozy’s 
foreign policy advisor, put it: “another Srebrenica in North Africa” 
had to be avoided.7 This animating preoccupation with the immediate 
fate of Benghazi also emerges clearly from David Cameron’s 
 
5 See https://reliefweb.int/report/libya/situation-human-rights-libyan-
arab-jamahiriya-statement-navy-pillay-un-high [retrieved on 27 April 2019] 
6 The words of Mark Lyall Grant, UK Permanent Representative to the UN, in 
testimony on 12 October 2011 (House of Commons Defence Committee, 2012, 
p.88). 
7 “Panel Discussion: Responsibility to Protect, Sovereignty, Long-term 
Responsibility”, at UNU-UNESCO conference on “21st Century Wars, 2003-
2014”, Paris, 27 February 2014. 
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recollection of events: “Benghazi was saved, and a Srebrenica-style 
slaughter was averted. I’ve never known relief like it”(Cameron, 
2019, p.281; see also p.275). Resolution 1973 explicitly excluded “a 
foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan 
territory”, a provision that appeared to further strengthen the R2P 
case for intervention (S/RES/1973, para.4). This, then, was the 
context that led observes and analysts at the time to conclude that 
the use of force under R2P was “ideally suited to the Libya 
situation, as it initially presented itself” (Eyal, 2012,p.55). 
 However, while regime change was not an original objective, it 
did not take long for the spirit and the constraints (vague as these 
were) of Resolution 1973 to be violated: an operation authorised “to 
take all measures necessary” to protect civilians became an exercise 
in regime change that involved actively taking sides in a civil war. 
This emerges clearly from an analysis of the nature and progress of 
NATO’s campaign, where, as an early assessment put it, the “chief 
participants clearly aimed to engineer Gadhafi’s downfall, but were 
unable to express this explicitly” (IISS, 2011). Air strikes not 
only targeted government forces in retreat and in areas where they 
did not pose any obvious threat to civilians, but, as the war 
dragged on, they increasingly co-ordinated air operations with rebel 
activities on the ground, providing, in the final stages of the war, 
close air support for rebels.8 In defiance of previous Council 
resolutions, France, UK, Qatar and UAE soon began to supply arms and 
equipment to rebel forces.9 These same countries, along with Egypt 
and the US, also deployed Special Forces inside Libya from an early 
stage to assist with training, advise and forward air control 
(RUSI,2011, pp.10-13; Taylor-Norton, 2011). Adding powerfully to the 
anger of Council members that had abstained on the Resolution now 
being stretched to secure the overthrow of the regime, France, the 
UK and the US closed down any further discussion in the Council 
 
8 According to NATO’s own figures, “approximately 6,000 military targets” 
were “damaged or destroyed” during the seven months campaign. See 
https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/topics_71652.htm [retrieved on 19 April 
2019] 
9 Of critical importance was the supply of weapons by France to rebels in 
the Nafusa mountains, reported and confirmed by the French government in 
June 2011, see  
 https://www.france24.com/en/20110629-french-military-confirms-airdropping-
arms-libya-kadhafi-rebel [ retrieved 3 May 2019 ] 
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about NATO’s escalating involvement and the evolving situation in 
Libya (Puri, 2016,p.91).10 
The speed with which the NATO operation expanded led many to 
view the civilian protection case made for Resolution 1973 as having 
been advanced in bad faith: protecting civilians was merely a cover 
for military intervention aimed at regime change. As suggested 
above, however, evidence does not support the view that intervention 
was a pre-planned exercise in regime change. Indeed, even Hardeep 
Singh Puri, privy to the internal Council debates on Libya at the 
time and one of the harshest and more eloquent critics of Western-
led intervention in Libya, accepts that “the jury is still out on 
whether regime change was the original objective” (Puri, 2016, 
p.103). Even so, there is no denying that Resolution 1973, as the 
those who had abstained on the grounds of the wide-sweeping nature 
of its authorisation to use force had feared, was interpreted in a 
way that allowed NATO to become a party to Libya’s civil war. Those 
who had welcomed Resolution 1973 as the realisation of the R2P had 
also warned against this very danger. Speaking at the start of the 
campaign, David Hannay stressed the importance of “stick[ing] firmly 
to the mandate to protect”, and warned “against being drawn into 
loose talk about targeting Gaddafi or speculating on the case for 
allowing mission creep to bring us towards regime change” (Hannay, 
2011, Column 1499). Hannay’s caution made perfect sense in R2P 
terms, the prism through which he viewed the significance of 
Resolution 1973.  
And yet, insistence on carefully calibrated restraint 
underrates the dynamic effects set in motion by outside military 
intervention in an active civil war, even though the primary 
motivation for intervention is to protect civilians. In the case of 
Libya, civil war arose out of a spontaneous uprising against an 
oppressive and hated regime determined to crush its opponents. There 
was no political process on the ground and no prospect for a 
negotiated end to the war. In these circumstances, it is difficult 
to see how, once operations had commenced, the intervening powers – 
lacking an overall political strategy or defined political end state 
 
10 Hardeep Singh Puri served as India’s Permanent Representative to the UN 
in New York from 2009 to 2013, and represented India as a non-permanent 
member of the Security Council in 2011 and 2012. 
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for the conflict in Libya - could have avoided being drawn into 
conflict. Even had NATO wished to stay above the political fray in 
an effort not to prejudge the outcome of the civil war, military 
intervention quickly acquired a logic of its own. As Michael Clarke 
observed, “the military logic of enforcing the UN resolution 
effectively turned the coalition into the air arm of the rebels in a 
civil war….” (Clark,2012, p.11). The consequence of this, the drift 
towards regime change, was evident, if not explicitly acknowledged, 
in the oxymoronic quality of the arguments advanced by President 
Obama, President Sarkozy and Prime Minister Cameron in an article 
published less than a month into NATO’s campaign. The aim of 
Resolution 1973, they stated, was “not to remove Gaddafi by force”, 
and yet, as they also added, “it is impossible to imagine a future 
for Libya with Gaddafi in power” (Sarkozy et.al, 2011).  
This leads to a further consideration. There was, in mid-March 
2011, broad acceptance of the view that the prospect of mass 
atrocity crimes in Libya was real, and, accordingly, that UN member 
states were confronted with a strong prima facia case for the use of 
force under R2P. After all, Russia and China chose not to use their 
veto, while India, Brazil and Germany all abstained rather than vote 
against Resolution 1973. The perceived excesses of NATO’s subsequent 
campaign led a number of countries to stress the need, in any future 
R2P operation, for States also to exercise a “responsibility while 
protecting” (RwP).11 This idea of RwP, as a distinct and separate 
concept, was formally presented to the Security Council by Brazil 
shortly after the end of NATO’s mission, and quickly garnered wide 
support from member states. The Brazilian initiative is of interest 
in part because it gave voice to the “growing perception that the 
concept of the responsibility to protect might be misused for 
purposes other than protecting civilians, such as regime change.”12 
The measures proposed actually to avoid such misuse, however, while 
sensible and unproblematic at one level, have a tautological, even 
platitudinous, quality to them. Summarising the concept in 2012, in 
a report devoted to Pillar III of the R2P, the Secretary-General 
stated: 
 
11 The Brazilian concept paper is published as “Annex to Letter from the 
Permanent Representative of Brazil to the Secretary-General, 9 November 
2011”, A/66/551-S/2011/701. 
12  Ibid.,para.10. 
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The essence of “responsibility while protecting” is doing the 
right thing, in the right place, at the right time and for the 
right reasons. Timely and decisive action puts a premium on 
assessment, on understanding what is happening, why it is 
happening, and how the international community can help keep a 
difficult situation from becoming worse”(UN Secretary-General, 
2012, paragraph 53). 
The level of abstraction at which this statement is pitched makes 
it entirely uncontroversial. It provides no basis, however, for 
engaging with the hard and difficult questions thrown up by the 
Libya case as set out above, questions that do not lend themselves 
to simple answers, and to which member states – states, lest one 
forgets, with different national interests, policy priorities and 
historical memories - are certain to offer a range of different, 
often competing, answers.  
The Significance of Historical Memory  
 
In Hope and Memory, the eminent historian Tzvetan Todorov closes his 
reflections on Europe’s political history in the 20th century with 
the controversies and substantive issues raised by NATO’s 
intervention in the Kosovo conflict in 1999 - a Western-led military 
campaign initiated against a sovereign state, undertaken without 
Security Council authorisation and justified in the name of human 
rights. Seeking to explain why so many non-European countries – in 
Africa, Asia and South America – were deeply wary of the “the right 
to interfere” on which NATO’s action was premised, Todorov 
highlighted the “difference in historical memory” (Todorov, 2005, 
p.275).  
 
“At least twice in their history European nations have invoked 
‘principles and values’ rather than national interest to justify 
actions taken outside their borders. And on both occasions they 
acted out of the conviction that they were proprietors of the 
good, whereas distant countries, on other continents, were 
allowing evil to flourish on their soil. So the Europeans sent 
off their armies to try to impose good on others”(Todorov, 
2005,p.275). 
 
 
Historical memory, Todorov implies, acts as a frame of reference 
through which contemporary developments are filtered and 
interpreted, shaping both the perceptions of interest and the 
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hierarchy of values that govern the priorities and behaviour of 
individual states within the international system. The historical 
experiences on which memories and narratives are based provide a 
particularly important context for understanding concerns long held 
by G-77/NAM countries about any weakening of the principle of 
sovereign equality and its corollary the rule of non-intervention; 
principles and rules which together are seen to perform a vital 
protective function vis-à-vis more powerful states. Disagreements 
and tensions over the operationalization of the R2P, and quite 
especially over the military implementation of the doctrine in 
Libya, have inevitably reflected these differences in memory and 
experience. Thus, when France’s Foreign Minister, Bernard Kouchner, 
in May 2008, suggested that the R2P should be invoked to enable the 
delivery of aid to cyclone-hit Myanmar without the approval of the 
military junta in the country, the reaction was entirely predictable 
(Parsons, 2008). Similarly, when the US delegate in the General 
Assembly discussion on the Secretary-General’s report on Pillar III 
of the R2P, in September 2012, chose to emphasise how that report 
“underscores [that] ‘coercive measures should neither be left out of 
our comprehensive strategy nor relegated to use only after other 
measures have been tried and found inadequate’”13, it was certain to 
be interpreted in a particular way, even though, technically, there 
was nothing inaccurate in the statement and the wider point that was 
being made. 
Now, Todorov is not alone in having pointed to the importance 
of historical frames of reference. Indeed, the background 
documentation prepared for the ICISS was careful to acknowledge how 
“powerful states have a long history of fabricating and employing 
tendentious legal arguments to rationalize intervention in weaker 
states” (ICISS, Supplementary Volume, 2001,p.67). And yet, among 
Western policy-makers, including advocates for action in Libya and 
earlier Kosovo, the wariness detected by Todorov has frequently been 
dismissed as disingenuous and self-serving, little more than an 
excuse for failing to take action in response conscious-shocking 
 
13 “Remarks by US Ambassador at UNGA Interactive Dialogue on the 
Responsibility to Protect, 5 September 2012,” US Mission to the United 
Nations. (My emphasis). 
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violations of human rights. Why? There are, it would seem, two 
answers to this.  
The first, quite simply, is that the charge of 
disingenuousness, drawing attention to the essentially self-serving 
character of objections to entrenching the R2P norm, cannot be 
dismissed out of hand. The fact that Russia and China in their 
capacity as permanent members of the Security Council have presented 
themselves, however implausibly, merely as disinterested and 
principled defender of the Charter and its order-related provisions, 
specifically the rule of non-intervention, invites, justifiably so, 
both cynicism and suspicion. In neither country, as noted above, 
have the political and decision-making elites embraced the 
conception of human rights and the conditional nature of sovereignty 
on which the case for R2P is based. The larger point, however, here 
goes beyond Russia and China. The list of countries with a poor to 
lamentable human rights record is long and includes many of those 
who have proved particularly resistant to the R2P norm, fearing that 
to do so would only widen scope for outsiders to prey into their 
domestic affairs. Resistance to intervening in defence of human 
rights should always be scrutinised for the admixture of motives it 
reflects. 
There is, however, a further dimension to this. The tendency 
to dismiss the concerns of non-Europeans (including India, Brazil 
and South Africa, all on the Council Libya crisis) also reflects a 
deeper failure on the part of political and decision-making elites 
within former imperial powers, most notably Britain and the France - 
both permanent Council members and both ardent champions of the R2P 
- to acknowledge, let alone engage critically, with the more 
uncomfortable and complex legacies of their Empires, including the 
reality that, in the words of Mark Mazover, ”human rights do not 
form an eternal language, they are enmeshed, whether we like it or 
not, in past European imperial forays” (Mazover, 2011). A detailed 
exploration of the historical and cultural reasons for this failure 
is beyond the scope of the article, though it should be stressed 
that the issue is not merely one of right-leaning historians and 
commentators extolling the virtues of Empire. Indeed, in the case of 
the UK, historians have played a vital role in documenting not only 
the brutality of colonial rule, but also the racist underpinnings 
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and violence at the heart of Empire.14 The obstacle to understanding 
the importance of historical memory also lies, as William Dalrymple 
has perceptively noted, in “the opposite, liberal, tendency to 
recoil from all memory of empire and to simply ignore and forget 
it”, resulting in “wilful obliviousness in Britain about the darker 
side of its imperial past” (Dalrymple, 2015). 
Added to this, but also closely linked to the longer-term 
historical concerns alluded to above, worries about the misuse of 
the R2P by more powerful states must also be seen in the context of 
post-9/11 developments, in particular the anxieties generated by 
doctrine of pre-emption promulgated by the US administration in the 
aftermath of 9/11 and the basis for use of force in its “Global War 
on Terror”. It is sometimes forgotten that the AUMF, the joint 
resolution passed by Congress on 14 September 2001 that gave the 
president sweeping powers to use “all necessary and appropriate 
force” to “prevent any future acts of international terrorism 
against the United States”, is still in effect (AUMF, 2001). And, as 
Falkenrath has observed of the AUMF: “Whilst it was primarily a de 
facto and immediate declaration of war against Al-Qa’ida, it was 
also a much more open-ended legal construction that authorized the 
President to use force in an extraordinarily broad set of 
circumstances with no end date set on the use of force, nor 
restrictions laid on the geographical locations and nationality of 
the targets” (Falkenrath, 2017, pp.73-74). 
And yet, for all this, recognising the role of historical 
memory, its impact on the hierarchy of values and perceptions of 
interest among states, is not tantamount to rejecting the 
universalism of human rights. Returning to Todorov: “The issue here 
is not the universality of rights and values, but their practical 
implementation in real societies – not ends, but means” (Todorov, 
2005,p.278). That, as shown above, has also been, and remains, a 
central challenge facing the R2P. 
 
III. R2P AND THE USE OF FORCE FOR HUMAN PROTECTION PURPOSES: 
STOCKTAKING AND PROSPECTS 
 
 
14 See, notably, David Anderson, Histories of the Hanged: Britain’s Dirty 
War in Kenya and the End of Empire (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 
2005). 
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When the General Assembly met in June 2018 to debate the R2P, 
wider geopolitical trends, internal political developments in key 
member states, and the stark realities faced by record-numbers of 
civilians caught up in war and violence, were all combining to raise 
profound questions about the future of the R2P. The grounds for 
concern were multiple: the dire state of political relations among 
major powers, as reflected in the near-complete breakdown of 
Security Council cooperation on issues of peace and security; 
evidence of a diminishing commitment to values-driven diplomacy and 
multilateralism, epitomised, symbolically, by John Bolton’s 
elevation to post US National Security Advisor in 2018; and, above 
all, evidence pointing to a worsening situation for civilians and 
vulnerable populations in zones of conflict. Nearly 70 million 
people were forcibly displaced as a result of “persecution, 
conflict, violence, or human rights violations” in 2017, the highest 
number ever recorded by the UN’s refugee agency (UNHCR, 2018). At 
the same time, a number of delegates to the R2P debate in New York 
continued to express concerns about the “political 
instrumentalization or exploitation” of R2P’s “noble objectives” (UN 
General Assembly, 2018,p.18). There is no denying the reality of 
these trends and their adverse implications for attempts to further 
strengthen the R2P. 
And yet, while the grounds for pessimism are real, the 
temptation to write the story of the R2P in simple rise-and-fall 
terms, or as some are now wont to do, a lost opportunity, is itself 
problematic.  
One reason for this is simply that some of the early optimism 
about the R2P’s galvanising potential as an emerging norm in 
international relations rested on an overly sanguine view of wider 
trends in world politics, underplaying, in particular, the 
continuing importance of interest and historical memory as 
determinants of state conduct. This gave rise to expectations 
unlikely to be fulfilled; expectations that did not fully recognise 
the extent to which progress in international affairs does not lend 
itself to simple linear measurement, is always susceptible to 
reversal, and is often double-edged and ambiguous. The importance of 
interest and history also provides part of the reason why agreement 
among state on the precise criteria for the use military force for 
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humanitarian purposes has proved, and will continue to prove, 
elusive. 
None of this is to suggest that progress in international 
relations is necessarily a chimera, and, indeed, there are other, 
more positive, grounds for challenging the view that the R2P project 
has reached a dead end. This, too, requires a longer-term historical 
perspective. It also requires, as noted at the outset, a clear 
distinction to be drawn between the R2P as standard or norm, and as 
a prescriptive guide to action and policy. For reasons explored 
above, the latter was always likely to run into difficulties. The 
former is a different matter.  
Paradoxically, part of the evidence for this is offered by the 
Libyan crisis itself. As violence was escalating and the 
humanitarian crisis deepening in February and March 2011, Russia and 
China along with South Africa, Brazil and India, all chose to vote 
in favour of Resolution 1970. In so doing, they recalled “the Libyan 
authorities’ responsibility to protect its population”, and noted 
that “the widespread and systematic attack currently taking place … 
against the civilian population may amount to crimes against 
humanity” (S/RES/1970, 2011). In terms of the evolution of ideas 
about what is and what is not acceptable behaviour in international 
society the unanimous adoption of Resolution 1970 is more revealing 
than Resolution 1973 that authorised NATO action. 
 In April 2014, the Security Council unanimously voted in 
favour of establishing a new, ambitious and large-scale peacekeeping 
operation for the Central African Republic (CAR) under Chapter VII 
of the Charter. It did so in response to “multiple violations of 
international humanitarian law and widespread human rights 
violations and abuses”, and it placed the protection of civilians 
(POC) at risk from mass atrocity crimes right at the centre of its 
mission (S/RES/2149, 2014). Addressing the General Assembly in 2018, 
António Guterres specifically referred to the Council’s decision to 
act in CAR as  “a positive example set by the international 
community … when there was a high risk of a genocidal killing spree” 
(UN General Assembly, 2018, p.3). Also in April 2014, the Council, 
following an intense debate over precise wording, passed a 
resolution marking the twentieth anniversary of the start of the 
Rwanda genocide. This resolution too was passed unanimously. It 
  
27 
called on States to “recommit” themselves “to prevent and fight 
against genocide, and other crimes under international law”, and, 
more significantly, explicitly reaffirmed the relevant paragraphs of 
the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document “on the responsibility to 
protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crime against humanity” (S/RES/2150, 2014). Significantly, both 
resolutions were passed little more than a month after Russia’s 
illegal annexation of Crimea had brought relations between Russia 
and Western Council members to a new low. 
The Secretary-General’s aforementioned reference to the UN’s 
lifesaving role in CAR highlights another way in which the R2P idea 
has impacted, more indirectly, on policy, specifically on UN 
peacekeeping policy. The basic acceptance of POC as a core task, not 
merely an ancillary function, of UN peacekeepers since 1999 point to 
a wider shift in the normative assumptions surrounding UN peace 
operations, however troubled and uneven in practice has been the 
implementation of individual POC mandates. In the case of South 
Sudan, the UN Mission, whilst profoundly overstretched and under-
resourced, saved tens of thousands of lives in 2013 and 2016 through 
the establishment and maintenance of POC sites (NUPI, 2019, pp.58-
60; see also UN Secretary-General, 2019).15 The attitude of member 
states and the concrete actions taken by UN on the ground in order 
to protect lives both in CAR and South Sudan – the sense that such 
action was both necessary and right – contrast sharply with 
comparable cases from the early post-Cold War period, most notably 
the experience of UNAMIR in Rwanda, and, as such, provide some 
evidence of a change in normative context and expectations.16  
The extent to which attitudes and normative assumptions have 
shifted emerges still more clearly when a longer-term historical 
perspective is adopted. Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in December 
1978 brought an end to the regime of Pol Pot. Awareness of the scale 
of the horrors perpetrated by Pol Pot’s regime may explain why, even 
 
15 According to one authoritative study of UNMISS’ performance, a widely 
expressed sentiment among South Sudanese is that UNMISS, by opening POC 
sites to offer physical protection, averted a genocide in the country in 
2013 and 2016 (NUPI, 2019, p.3). 
16 This is not to say that mass atrocities have not continued to be 
perpetrated in South Sudan and CAR, nor is it meant to imply that the 
protection crisis in either of one of the countries is no longer acute (R2P 
Monitor, 2019,p.13).  
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though Vietnam did not seek to justify its invasion on humanitarian 
grounds, several Western members on the Security Council, in the 
debate that followed the fall of Phnom Penh, decided to address the 
issue of whether or not Vietnam’s invasion could be justified on 
humanitarian grounds.17 Their conclusion could not have been more 
unequivocal. “Whatever is said about human rights in Kampuchea,” the 
UK representative made clear, “it cannot excuse Vietnam … for 
violating the territorial integrity of Democratic Kampuchea” (UN 
Security Council, 1979). Australia similarly insisted that “the 
internal policies of any Government, no matter how reprehensible” 
could never justify outside military intervention (UN Security 
Council, 1979, paragraph 25). The Cold War context and the fact the 
US itself had recently suffered a traumatic defeat at the hands of 
Vietnam must necessarily be factored into the analysis of the 1979 
Cambodia debate. Even so, the categorical rejection of the argument 
that the domestic policies of a Government, when these involve mass 
atrocity crimes, cannot justify outside military intervention is 
something that the basic and general acceptance of the R2P norm has 
made untenable.18     
 
CONCLUDING REFLECTION 
 
In November 2012, an Internal Review Panel on the actions of 
the UN during the final stages of the Sri Lankan civil war was 
unsparing in its criticisms of the organisation’s failure to “meet 
protection responsibilities” towards civilians caught up in the 
conflict. Among its findings, the final report also noted that the 
UN’s response was not helped by “frequently inconclusive discussions 
on the concept of the Responsibility to Protect” (‘Petrie Report’, 
paragraph 77). The report was detailed and meticulous in its 
 
17 None of the ASEAN countries – Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, the 
Philippines and Thailand – made reference to mass atrocities committed by 
Pol Pot’s regime. 
18 This lends support to Thomas Franck’s view on how international law 
itself is evolving: as process to be “understood in less absolute and more 
dynamically transactional terms, as a system of norms constantly engaged in 
a process of challenge, adaptation, and reformulation.” See Thomas M. 
Franck, ‘Interpretation and change in the law of humanitarian 
intervention’, in J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert O.Keohane, Humanitarian 
Intervention – Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge, CUP, 
2003), p.204. 
  
29 
coverage, and much of the criticism contained in it, especially that 
relating to the UN’s “systemic failures” in response the evolving 
humanitarian crisis in Sri Lanka, was warranted. Its findings 
prompted welcome and potentially significant initiatives aimed at 
improving UN’s capacity to respond in the future, including the 
“Human Rights up Front” initiative launched by the Secretary General 
in 2013. 
There is, however, a further aspect to the Petrie Report that 
merits attention in the context of the present article. For all its 
detail and undoubted value as an account of events in which as many 
as forty thousand civilians may have been killed, it also appeared 
to rest on a fundamentally flawed assumption: “All Member States 
regret and would wish to prevent situations where there is large-
scale loss of human life”(‘Petrie Report’, paragraph 86). Whether or 
not this striking sentence was inserted to placate politically 
sensitive Member States, the historical and contemporary record show 
it to be profoundly wrong. Had it been otherwise, the challenge of 
operationalizing or implementing the R2P would have been far more 
straightforward, a mere technical and organisational challenge. Yet, 
the uncomfortable truth is that a distressingly large number of 
States and non-state actors have shown, and continue to show, 
neither regret nor willingness to prevent “large-scale loss of human 
life”. The horrors of Rwanda and Srebrenica have been followed by 
numerous other mass atrocity crimes. It is for this reason, above 
all, that efforts to entrench the R2P norm, despite setbacks and 
inauspicious geopolitical circumstances, must continue. Consensus on 
implementing the norm will continue to prove elusive but the 
discussion itself remains vitally important. 
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